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Contributing Factors to the 
Emergence of Systemic Risks
by Belinda Cleeland, International Risk 
Governance Council, Geneva1
IRGC’s emerging-risks project explores the 
origins of emerging systemic risks, and, in 
ongoing work, is developing guidance for 
practitioners on how to improve their antici-
pation of and response to these risks. This 
article describes the IRGC’s concept of “con-
tributing factors” to risk emergence: gener-
ic factors that can affect the likelihood that 
a new risk will emerge, or the severity of its 
consequences. We explore here the factors 
that are particularly pertinent to systemic 
risks, because they derive largely from inter-
actions and interdependencies, and relate to 
the properties of complex systems. We also 
emphasise the importance of taking a sys-
tems perspective and of understanding traits 
common to complex systems.2
1 Introduction
The International Risk Governance Council 
(IRGC) defines as “emerging” a risk that is new, 
or a familiar risk that becomes apparent in new 
or unfamiliar conditions. Of particular interest to 
the IRGC are emerging risks of a systemic na-
ture, which typically span more than one country, 
more than one economic sector, and may have 
effects across natural, technological and social 
systems. These risks may be relatively low in fre-
quency, but they have broad ramifications for hu-
man health, safety and security, the environment, 
economic well-being and the fabric of societies.
In its latest report – the outcome of phase 
1 of its ongoing project on emerging risks – the 
International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) 
explores the origins of emerging systemic risks, 
in describing and illustrating twelve generic con-
tributing factors that can affect the likelihood of 
a new risk emerging, or the severity of its conse-
quences. Rather than simply listing and describ-
ing important emerging risks, the aim of IRGC’s 
project is to examine how these risks eventuate, 
and to provide risk practitioners with insights 
that can help them better anticipate and deal with 
systemic risks in the early phase of their devel-
opment. Being aware of the twelve contributing 
factors, and appreciating their potential impacts 
can provide new perspectives on risks or inform 
risk management decisions.
In order to understand the role of these 
factors in risk emergence, consider the follow-
ing metaphor of a plant emerging from fertile 
ground: once a seed is sown, there is a key set 
of factors that affect the probability that a plant 
will grow, including, for example, nutrient and 
mineral content, pH, soil structure, drainage and 
micro-organism content. In the same way, the 
contributing factors described by the IRGC can 
combine to create “fertile ground” from which 
new risks can emerge and be amplified.
The twelve contributing factors below are 
highly interdependent, and may be ordered or 
prioritised in many different ways (see Fig. 1). 
The numbers do not by any means indicate an or-
der of importance – indeed, such an assessment 
could only be usefully made with a specific situ-
ation in mind. One possible way to conceptualise 
the list of factors is to view them as operating 
at three different “levels”: factors 1–4 are more 
structural in nature, and have to do with the prop-
erties of the complex systems often implicated in 
systemic risk emergence, or elements (e.g., ge-
ography, genetics) that interact with these prop-
erties. Factors 5–7 operate more at the level of 
human society, and deal with aspects that derive 
from human nature, behaviour and actions, with 
a focus on social and cultural relations and ad-
vancement. Moving from the broader societal 
level to the level of individual actors, factors 
8–12 deal with the impact that personal or insti-
tutional decisions can have on risk emergence. 
Of course, these categories are not air-tight, and 
some factors, communication in particular, could 
be interpreted as influencing many of the others.
While some of the twelve contributing fac-
tors may be considered to be relevant for all risks 
(ordinary and systemic alike), there are others that 
are particularly pertinent to systemic risks, because 
they derive largely from interactions and interde-
pendencies, and relate to the properties of complex 
systems. We will discuss some of these factors be-
low, namely: “loss of safety margins”, “positive 
feedback” and “varying susceptibilities to risk”.
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Before turning to discussion of these factors, 
however, it is first important to think about per-
spective and context – risks do not emerge in an 
isolated manner, and the emergence of risks that 
exhibit systemic character is particularly unlikely 
to be a straightforward process, where cause and 
effect are easily identifiable. For these reasons, 
the IRGC stresses the significance of taking a 
systems perspective and recognising complexity: 
understanding what is meant by “complex sys-
tem” and some of the traits commonly associated 
with complexity.
2 The Systems Perspective
This “systems perspective” refers to a school of 
thought that is based on the work of systems the-
orists, and may be applied to any type of system, 
whether biological (the human heart), engineered 
(the electric power grid), mechanical (transport 
and logistics systems), ecological (a forest), eco-
nomic (the stock market), social (a neighbour-
hood) or geopolitical (the Middle East). When 
considering parts of a system, system theorists 
are particularly interested in how the parts relate 
Fig. 1: IRGC’s 12 contributing factors to risk emergence
Source: Own compilation
to each other and their context within the larger 
system. While a single dominant cause may 
sometimes explain an emerging risk, it is more 
common that multiple interacting factors are at 
work, with interactions occurring both within the 
system and between systems (system-system in-
teractions). Therefore, professionals responsible 
for anticipating the emergence of risks can ben-
efit from a systems perspective.
The systems perspective advocates viewing 
systems in a holistic manner, meaning that the 
system is seen as representing more than just the 
sum of its parts, and that the whole influences 
how the parts behave. Describing the system as 
a whole can stimulate insights about emerging 
systemic risks and about how they should be ad-
dressed. For example, in a recent safety scandal 
that damaged one of the most successful com-
panies in the automobile industry, Toyota found 
that it was not sufficient to test thoroughly the 
parts of a system that comprise the automobile. 
As acknowledged by Toyota’s chief quality of-
ficer at a news conference: the company did not 
look carefully enough at “how vehicle parts per-
form as a whole inside the car under different en-
vironmental conditions” (Linebaugh et al. 2010).
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In contrast, reductionism (which proposes 
that the behaviour of a system can be explained 
by breaking it down into its component parts) 
can be useful for understanding the emergence 
of simple risks, but it is usually unable to explain 
fully and to anticipate some risks that emerge 
and exhibit systemic character.
The science of ecology provides many ex-
amples of how a systems perspective is useful 
in understanding the complexity of interactions 
between elements of a whole, as well as system-
system interactions. For example, climatic cues 
such as water availability and temperature af-
fect the timing of pollination and the life cycles 
of pollinators, as do invasive species and local 
and regional chemical pollution. The interaction 
of some or all of these elements could lead to a 
dangerous decline in the frequency and rate of 
pollination, which, through system-system in-
teractions, could pose environmental risks (loss 
of plant and animal biodiversity), climate risks 
(loss of vegetative cover could further influence 
climate change), and social and economic risks 
(production of fruit, vegetables, meat and milk 
could be diminished, and many diverse indus-
trial interests harmed, from pharmaceuticals to 
perfume to bioenergy) (IRGC 2009).
3 Recognising Complexity
A systems perspective is especially relevant 
when considering complex systems, as it is from 
complex systems that emerging risks (especially 
systemic ones) often arise.
Complex systems may be defined scientifi-
cally as systems “composed of many parts that 
interact with and adapt to each other” (OECD 
2009). In most cases, the behaviour of such sys-
tems cannot be adequately understood only by 
studying their component parts. This is because 
the behaviour of such systems arises through 
the interactions among those parts. When con-
sidering the factors that contribute to the emer-
gence of risks, a discussion of the role of com-
plexity and the traits of complex systems is a 
useful place to start, because complexity can 
encompass, or at least strongly influence, many 
of these factors. It can be, in many cases, part 
of the background conditions or context within 
which these factors operate.
The behaviour of complex systems may 
involve random variation, and is therefore of-
ten unpredictable and hard to control (Helbing 
2009).3 Complex adaptive systems (CAS) are 
of particular relevance: they are special cases 
of complex systems with the capacity to change 
and learn from experience. When a CAS is per-
turbed, it tries to adapt. If the system fails to 
adapt, this may undermine its resilience and 
sustainability, potentially resulting in collapse 
(or a flip to a new equilibrium). Examples in-
clude ecosystems, ant colonies, the immune 
system and political parties.
The following traits, common to many 
complex systems, are relevant to emerging 
risks. They have the effect of increasing the 
unpredictability of the system’s future behav-
iour and, as a result, risk anticipation becomes 
more difficult.
•	 Emergence: outcomes that emerge from the 
system are novel, meaning that they cannot 
be explained or predicted from the properties 
of particular system components, or what 
these components do on their own. Flocking 
behaviour is an emergent property of a group 
of birds that could not be predicted from 
complete knowledge about any single bird. 
The stock market exemplifies emergence 
on a much larger scale, creating novel mar-
ket rules, valuations, bubbles and crashes, 
which are quite unpredictable, and are not 
guided or controlled by any one centralised 
actor, but rather by thousands or millions of 
self-interested actors.
•	 Non-linearity (disproportional causation): 
causes and effects are not simply proportion-
al to each other, and can lead to unexpected 
outcomes (small changes sometimes cause 
big effects, while big changes sometimes 
have little effect). Non-linearity is also a rea-
son why the behaviour of complex systems 
often cannot be predicted based only on an 
understanding of the behaviour of the sys-
tem’s component parts.
•	 Inertia: Complex systems may exhibit time 
lags of varying and often indeterminate 
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length between a given perturbation and the 
system’s behavioural response.
•	 Threshold behaviour: Phase transitions oc-
cur abruptly as the system crosses a critical 
threshold (“tipping point”), and flips from 
one state to another. Such flips involve a 
substantial reorganisation of the system’s 
internal relationships, and may involve re-
gime shifts to a new equilibrium. Examples 
include the sudden collapse of a fishery, the 
point where an infectious disease reaches 
epidemic proportions, or the transition from 
free traffic flow to stop-and-go waves, or 
other kinds of congestion. Phase transitions 
may not be completely unpredictable. Early 
warning signs for these critical transitions 
often exist, and many different kinds of sys-
tems display a phenomenon known as “criti-
cal fluctuations” – when they show larger 
and more frequent perturbations. Further-
more, some systems display a phenomenon 
called “critical slowing-down” – when sys-
tems become progressively slower in recov-
ering from perturbations – as they approach 
the critical point (Scheffer et al. 2009).
•	 Hysteresis and Path Dependency: When a 
system with hysteresis moves to a new state 
as a result of a stimulus or perturbation, it 
does not return to its initial state along the 
same path when the stimulus or perturbation 
is removed. For example, when a piece of 
iron is brought into a magnetic field, it re-
tains some magnetization, even once the 
field is removed. The system is then said to 
have memory and to exhibit path depend-
ency, meaning that its state at any particu-
lar time depends on the path the system fol-
lowed. The order of past events can affect 
the order of subsequent events, and move-
ment along that path is not reversible. A re-
turn to a previous state may be impossible. 
If it is possible, the system is likely to return 
via a path different from the one it followed 
previously. Physical, biological and socio-
economic systems can all exhibit hysteresis 
and path dependency. A socio-economic ex-
ample is the unemployment rate, where a 
short-term rise tends to persist long after the 
perturbation (e.g., a recession) has ended.
The above characteristics of complex systems 
demonstrate why it is difficult for risk manag-
ers to anticipate system behaviour, or to attempt 
any control of it. However, the IRGC believes 
that an understanding of these key traits can nev-
ertheless inform and improve risk governance. 
Furthermore, other traits common to complex 
systems may act to make risk emergence less 
likely. Adaptability and self-organisation are ex-
amples of such traits.
•	 Adaptability means that the independent com-
ponents that form the complex system can in-
teract and change their behaviour in response 
to changed external conditions.
•	 Self-organisation means that this adaptation 
occurs autonomously. This confers a cop-
ing capacity onto the system, allowing it to 
withstand some perturbations, which could 
otherwise be destabilising. Additionally, self-
organisation can lead to increased robustness 
and resource efficiency in the complex sys-
tem (Helbing 2008), which can be utilised to 
reduce the likelihood that risks will emerge.
A first step for risk managers is to examine the 
system closely, to determine whether or not it is 
“complex” (in the scientific sense). If this is the 
case, then the next step is to determine which of the 
common traits described above could apply, and 
therefore, which actions could be most effective.
This background information – this context 
of systems complexity – should be kept in mind 
as we move on to examine some of the generic 
factors that can contribute to the emergence of 
systemic risks.
4 Endogenous Factors of Systems that Can 
Influence Risk Emergence
The three contributing factors described below 
are those that, out of the twelve described by the 
IRGC, are among the more dependent on com-
plex system dynamics. As the number of compo-
nents/actors and interdependencies in society’s 
functional systems continues to increase, these 
are some of the factors at work that can result 
in the degree of complexity in a system crossing 
the threshold from “high, yet functional” to “dys-
functional and susceptible to emerging risks”.
SCHWERPUNKT
Technikfolgenabschätzung – Theorie und Praxis 20. Jg., Heft 3, Dezember 2011  Seite 17
4.1 Loss of Safety Margins
Increasing interconnectedness is evident in to-
day’s globalised world. Greater (and faster) 
connectivity is appealing, because it can boost 
communication, economic production and soci-
etal innovation. The connectivity of social sys-
tems allows people to exchange experiences and 
knowledge on an international scale, which can 
act as an important attenuator of risk. However, 
as systems become more interdependent, faster 
and more complex, they may also become more 
tightly-coupled, where the links between the 
components in the system are very short, mean-
ing that each component can have an almost im-
mediate and major impact on one or more other 
components in the system (see Perrow 1999). 
This tight coupling is synonymous with a loss of 
safety margins in a system, which leaves the sys-
tem more vulnerable to surprises – even a small 
mechanical failure or accident can have grave 
consequences, perhaps even leading to a system 
breakdown (Homer-Dixon 2006).
Fig. 2: Relationship between system stress and 
risk, holding system coping capacity 
constant
Source: Own compilation
A system’s safety margin can be understood to 
be its buffering capacity or slack. But perhaps 
the most useful way to grasp the concept is to 
compare the stress a system is exposed to with its 
coping capacity. Once increasing stress exceeds 
the coping capacity, the system has lost its safety 
margin, and enters a state of overload, which can 
precipitate a breakdown, or other kind of non-
linear shift in behaviour (see Figure 2).
Tight coupling and the corresponding loss 
of safety margins are features that characterise 
many emerging systemic risks, whether in the 
context of financial, environmental, or techno-
logical systems. Policy responses to these emerg-
ing risks, too, must operate in a context of high 
and increasing connectivity, creating an environ-
ment where the amplification of emerging risks 
could occur if interventions to mitigate one risk 
inadvertently exacerbate others in unforeseeable 
ways by reducing safety margins.
There are two key situations that can arise in 
coupled systems, both of which may result in the 
emergence of systemic risks:
First, there is an increased risk of unantici-
pated interactions occurring among previously 
separated system components (or even among 
previously separated whole systems) (see Ves-
pignani 2010). Thus, if two or more failures 
affecting different system components occur 
independently, these failures may interact in an 
unexpected way, resulting in an unforeseeable, 
undesirable outcome.
Second, there is an increased risk of cascad-
ing failures, when a failure of one component in 
a system can cause failures or other disturbances 
in other components. The more tightly the com-
ponents in the system are connected, the faster 
and further a shock or failure can propagate 
throughout the system.
Illustrations of cascading effects abound: 
the failure of one major financial institution can 
cause others to fail; one malfunction in an elec-
trical system can trigger massive widespread 
blackouts; or when the leader of a political party 
suffers a popularity setback, the adverse effects 
can extend to the entire party. An ecological ex-
ample is that of the collapse of the Barents Sea 
capelin fishery in 1986 (Hamre 2003).
Fortunately, risk managers have several op-
tions for minimising undesirable outcomes that 
can result from tight coupling and the loss of 
safety margins. In some systems, firewalls can be 
added to limit the spread of damage among the 
components (e.g., they are used to protect elec-
trical systems, or to defend computer systems 
against malicious intrusion). Building system 
SCHWERPUNKT
Seite 18 Technikfolgenabschätzung – Theorie und Praxis 20. Jg., Heft 3, Dezember 2011 
structures with more redundancy and resilience 
(where each component in the system has not 
only the ability to draw on other components for 
support, but also, crucially, a degree of self-suffi-
ciency to fall back on in case of emergency) can 
limit cascading effects. However, specific incen-
tives are often needed to encourage these meas-
ures, which may be costly to put in place, and 
provide no benefit, except in case of emergency 
(Homer-Dixon 2006). Making investments such 
as these can be problematic, as it involves resist-
ing pressure from shareholders or taxpayers to 
reduce what is seen as unnecessary spending. 
Such pressures often lead organisations to reduce 
their safety margins to dangerously low levels.
4.2 Positive Feedback
A system exhibits positive feedback when, in 
response to a perturbation, the system reacts in 
such a way that the original perturbation is am-
plified. A perturbation that is initially small can 
therefore grow to become so large as to destabi-
lise the whole system. In this context, the term 
“positive” does not refer to the desirability of the 
outcome, but only to the direction of change (am-
plification of the perturbation). Because positive 
feedback tends to be destabilising, it can poten-
tially increase the likelihood or consequences of 
the emergence of a new systemic risk. In con-
trast, negative feedback is fundamentally sta-
bilising as it counteracts the initial change. For 
example, many systems in the human body use 
negative feedback to maintain system parameters 
within a narrow functional range (e.g., regulation 
of blood pressure or body temperature).
Positive feedback occurs in both natural and 
social systems. With regard to climate change, 
for example, various positive feedback dynam-
ics within the carbon cycle are well known. The 
warming of the atmosphere that is occurring due 
to increased anthropogenic emissions of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases is causing 
(among other things) permafrost melt and tropi-
cal forest dieback. Melting permafrost releases 
trapped methane, which is a powerful green-
house gas, and tropical forest dieback reduces 
the strength of an important carbon sink, which 
results in less carbon dioxide uptake from the at-
mosphere – both of these processes further am-
plify global warming, and are thus instances of 
positive feedback (Frame, Allen 2008).
A financial panic or a stock market collapse 
is a classic example of positive feedback within a 
social system. In this case, if some market actors 
become nervous and sell stocks, this behaviour 
makes others more fearful, and they sell, too. As 
fears are further amplified, panic selling ensues, 
resulting in plummeting prices and financial 
losses. Because of the high degree of connectiv-
ity in today’s financial markets (allowing for fast 
communication and transactions), positive feed-
back can cause a crisis to spread quickly, thus 
greatly amplifying the financial consequences 
(Homer-Dixon 2006).
Although, as the previous example demon-
strates, the occurrence of positive feedback is re-
lated to the level of connectivity in a system – in 
that a more connected system offers more pos-
sibilities for feedback, both positive and nega-
tive – powerful positive feedback dynamics can 
nevertheless occur in relatively simple systems. 
For this reason, risk managers should look spe-
cifically for the presence of feedback, and not 
simply at connectivity. Sharp flips of system be-
haviour, or, more generally, disproportionality of 
cause and effect, are both strong indicators that 
positive feedback dynamics may be operating.
The presence of feedback in systems is com-
mon, and does not necessarily lead to systemic 
risks or even to a negative outcome. On the con-
trary, both positive and negative feedback can be 
essential for the proper functioning of systems, 
and it is the interplay of both kinds of feedback 
that gives rise to the system’s ultimate behaviour. 
It is therefore important for analysts to identify 
feedbacks (both positive and negative) occurring 
in a system, and assess their function and their 
relative balance (if either positive or negative 
dominates), in order to anticipate better when 
risks might emerge or be amplified.
4.3 Varying Susceptibilities to Risk
Risk does not affect all individuals or popula-
tions in an equal manner. Contextual factors, 
such as geographical location, genetic makeup 
(biological fitness), resource availability or 
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prior experience all affect susceptibility, which 
in turn impacts the probability, scale and sever-
ity of the risk and its consequences. Neglect of 
varying (or differential) susceptibilities – or of 
changing susceptibilities over time – can there-
fore lead to over- or underestimation of the 
emergence and possible impacts of a systemic 
risk, as well as miscalculation of the risk’s pro-
jected future development.
Many weather-induced risks – drought, hur-
ricanes, ice storms – affect only limited parts of 
the world and a minority of the world’s popula-
tion. The impacts of climate change will be felt 
all over the world, but the precise impacts will 
vary: coastal areas affected by rising sea levels 
will not be affected equally, depending on local 
factors such as coastal slope, the built infrastruc-
ture, the occurrence of storms and surges, and the 
ability of coastal ecosystems to adapt to sea level 
changes and storm damage.
Indeed, the same phenomenon that places 
susceptible people at risk of harm may benefit 
others. Most people view the melting of the 
Arctic ice sheet as an event with only adverse 
consequences, but it has already opened up a 
summer shipping route north of Russia that 
can shorten some voyages, and will offer some 
commercial benefits.
Evolution is an on-going process, and is, 
for example, the natural phenomenon behind 
the emergence of new viruses and bacteria and 
the ability of bacteria to mutate and to develop 
resistance to antibiotics. Natural selection, a key 
mechanism of evolution, explains why some 
human populations are less susceptible to some 
diseases than others – for example, some popu-
lations living in areas where malaria is endemic 
show greater resistance to the parasite (Fortin 
et al. 2002). But the genetic variation that is a 
driving force of evolution can also create gene 
variants that predispose individuals to disease. 
For example, specific gene variants are known 
to contribute to causing obesity, some cancers, 
and other diseases.
When it comes to risks arising from personal 
behaviour, psychology also plays a central role. 
Due to what has been called “optimism bias”, 
people often see themselves as being less suscep-
tible to risks than others, with this “risk denial” 
being stronger when people feel they have a de-
gree of control over the hazard (e.g., smoking, 
alcohol) (Sjöberg 2000). At the personal level, 
therefore, perceived variability in susceptibility 
may not match real variability.
Where there is real variability in suscep-
tibility at the personal level, this is frequently 
a result of people adapting their behaviour in 
response to risk as they learn from past expe-
riences. For example, the experienced skier or 
sailor is less at risk than a beginner, particularly 
in difficult conditions. In Japan, for example, 
the knowledge of what to do in case of an earth-
quake is widespread in the population. But peo-
ple and governments differ in their capacities for 
responding to risks, whether due to differing re-
sources, traditions or other factors. History sug-
gests that, for many risks, it is the low-income 
households and countries that are both more sus-
ceptible and less able to respond.
Thus, as susceptibility varies between dif-
ferent individuals, groups or locations, as it in-
creases or decreases over time as a result of 
physical changes (e.g., of climate or genetic 
makeup) or behavioural changes (e.g., via learn-
ing or changing norms), the consequences of an 
emerging systemic risk may be amplified or at-
tenuated, and its future trajectory may be altered.
5 Conclusion
The three factors that we have outlined here can 
all – either alone or, more likely, in combina-
tion with the remaining nine factors described 
by IRGC (IRGC 2010) – contribute to the emer-
gence or amplification of systemic risks. For the 
first two factors, the focus is on complexity, as 
both factors describe mechanisms and interac-
tions that are endogenous to complex systems:
•	 loss of safety margins occurs when the number 
of elements in the system increases, and these 
elements become more tightly coupled within 
the system, leading to unanticipated interac-
tions or cascading failures, if stress on one or 
more elements becomes too great;
•	 positive feedback mechanisms operating 
within the system result in the amplification 
of perturbations, such that an initially small 
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disturbance can quickly grow to become so 
destabilising that the functionality of the sys-
tem becomes compromised.
For the third factor, however, the focus is on the 
systemic dimension of the risk:
•	 varying susceptibilities to risk exist because 
the consequences of an emerging systemic 
risk are likely to be felt over a wide geo-
graphic range, across multiple economic sec-
tors and by elements of both social and eco-
logical systems. Focusing on the risk while 
ignoring how susceptibilities differ and how 
they change over time, may lead to inappro-
priate or inefficient risk mitigation or prepar-
edness and other unwelcome surprises (e.g., 
the emergence of new, secondary risks).
As important as the twelve contributing factors 
are, they are not necessarily exhaustive, and they 
are certainly not a substitute for detailed subject 
knowledge of each emerging risk. Rather, man-
agers may find it useful to consider the ramifica-
tions of detailed subject knowledge by thinking 
through the factors, and determining which ones 
are relevant to the emerging risk in question.
In formulating and describing the contrib-
uting factors, the IRGC has drawn on insights 
from concepts and applications in systems 
theory, especially on the recent advances in un-
derstanding how complex systems give rise to 
unexpected risks. While the concept of factors 
is useful for understanding the “mechanisms 
of systemic risk production” better, it does not 
immediately suggest many concrete solutions 
for risk managers who must address the chal-
lenge of how better to anticipate and respond 
to emerging risks. Overcoming obstacles such 
as uncertainty, knowledge gaps, conflicting val-
ues and interests, and cognitive biases will re-
quire not only enhanced capabilities (e.g., for 
surveillance and data collection, understanding 
human decision-making, regularly reviewing 
communication and decision-making processes, 
increased organisational flexibility and build-
ing robustness, redundancies and resilience), 
but also an organisational risk culture that can 
utilise these capabilities properly. This risk cul-
ture, which embodies the organisation’s risk 
“appetite”, reflects its goals and strategies, and 
informs how its risk-related decisions are made, 
should strive to establish a climate of openness 
and humility during the early phases of identi-
fying and responding to emerging risks. Such 
a change in risk culture will be difficult, but it 
may be a necessary precondition for truly adap-
tive approaches to emerging systemic risks. The 
importance of risk culture plus insights into 
means of overcoming some of the key obstacles 
to changing risk culture and to building the nec-
essary capabilities mentioned above are the fo-
cus of phase two of the IRGC’s emerging-risks 
project. The phase 2 Concept Note (IRGC 2011) 
presents eleven themes, each derived from a 
commonly encountered obstacle to effective 
emerging risk management. It describes and il-
lustrates the themes in such a way as to provide 
clarity to risk managers and to set forth ideas for 
more proactive emerging risk management. The 
next steps in phase 2 of the project will involve 
the development of an emerging risk protocol 
aimed at providing practical guidance on how 
to manage risks upstream of the conventional 
processes (where the IRGC’s Risk Governance 
Framework ca be applied).
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Switzerland), Dr. Michel Maila (Vice President, 
Risk Management, International Finance Corpo-
ration, USA), Jeffrey McNeely (Senior Scien-
tific Advisor, IUCN – The International Union 
for Conservation of Nature, Switzerland), Dr. 
Stefan Michalowski (Executive Secretary, Glo-
bal Science Forum, OECD, France), Prof. Erik 
Millstone (Professor of Science and Technol-
ogy Policy, University of Sussex, UK) and Dr. 
Mary Wilson (Associate Professor in the Depart-
ment of Global Health and Population, Harvard 
School of Public Health, Harvard University, 
USA), with support from Martin Weymann (Vice 
President, Risk Management, Swiss Reinsurance 
Company) and the IRGC staff members Belinda 
Cleeland and Marie Valentine Florin.
3) In contrast, complicated systems may have nu-
merous components, but these components will 
always interact in a predictable way, making them 
much more controllable.
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Die nächste Ausgabe der TATuP erscheint 
im Frühjahr 2012. „Algen“ als nachhaltige 
Energie- und Wertstoffproduzenten werden 
das Thema des Schwerpunktes sein, der von 
Christine Rösch, Clemens Posten und Kolle-
gen verantwortet wird.
